Cresec

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Four ways to secure AI routines. One takes the choice away from the model.

Most teams will use more than one. Here is what each approach controls, and what a fooled model can still do under it.

Approaches to securing AI routines, what each controls and what a fooled model can still do
ApproachExamplesWhat it controlsIf the model is fooledUse it when
Native admin controlsClaude Team and Enterprise, ChatGPT Enterprise, CopilotWhich skills, connectors and plugins people may useIt still chooses calls inside the allowed connectorsEveryone needs a baseline
Agent identity and gatewaysArcade, Runlayer, Pipedream Conduit, Auth0 for AI AgentsWho the agent acts as, and which tools it may callAn injected call to an allowed tool looks like a real oneOpen-ended agents must act as specific people
Detection and guardrailsNoma, Zenity, Lakera, Prompt SecurityFlags suspicious prompts, outputs and behaviourKnown patterns are caught; adaptive attacks can get throughYou need visibility across many agents
Hand-built workflowsn8n, Zapier, Retool, Power AutomateSteps someone builds and maintains by handSame protection as Cresec if every step is fixed; agent steps bring the risk backYour team already builds and owns workflows
CresecThis siteCompiles routines into fixed code with typed model slots and signed recordsIt can change words in a draftA routine reads untrusted text, sees private data and sends messages out

If you already use one of these

Test any vendor, including us

Use one routine and one poisoned input, and assume the model is fooled. Then ask each vendor two questions:

  1. What is the worst action a fooled model can take?
  2. Which recipients can it reach?

Why the guarantee holds

Google DeepMind’s CaMeL separates a program’s steps from the untrusted data it reads, and a 2025 design-patterns paper shows why fixed plans stop injected tool calls. In a Cresec tool, untrusted text can still sway which declared option the model picks. It can’t add an action, a recipient or app access.